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Abstract: Historically, the European Union has been characterized by different legal formulations. 
Positions are divided, broadly speaking, between those that understand this entity as an international 
organization in the classical sense, to those others which claim that its features are actually of a State-
nature, and that the obvious model of evolution would be the Federal State. In the end, all this leads us, 
undoubtedly, to the European constitutional project. In this work we give a brief account of all these 
proposals, and then we try to adopt a different point of view: for us, the nature of the European Union 
should not be looked for in the legal configuration of the political project, but also in the silent evolution 
-and not so silent- of a legal order, the European legal order, that is increasingly systematic, and that must 
boast a key position on the evolution towards a higher level of legal organization, global 
constitutionalism. In the building up of this proposal, we will appeal to the concept of global ethics and to 
the recent example of the CETA case of TJUE, which opens the European Legal system to alien 
influences.  
 
Key words: Legal nature of the european project, global constitutionalism, global ethics, international 
arbitration.  
 
Resumen: Históricamente, se ha caracterizado la Unión Europea mediante diversas fórmulas jurídicas. 
Las posiciones se dividen, a grandes rasgos, entre aquellas que conciben esta entidad como una 
organización internacional en sentido clásico, hasta aquellas que propugnan que sus rasgos son los 
propios de un Estado, y que su modelo evidente de evolución sería el Estado Federal. En el fondo de la 
cuestión se encuentra, sin duda, el proyecto constitucional europeo. En el presente trabajo damos breve 
cuenta de estas propuestas, para después optar por un punto de vista distinto de ellas: para nosotros, la 
naturaleza de la Unión Europea no debe buscarse sólo en la configuración jurídica del proyecto político, 
sino también en la propia evolución silenciosa -o no tanto- de un ordenamiento, el de la Unión Europea, 
que va ganando forma sistemática, y que debe ostentar una posición clave en la evolución hacia un nivel 
de organización jurídica mayor, el constitucionalismo global. En la construcción de esta propuesta, 
recurriremos al concepto de ética mundial y al ejemplo reciente del caso CETA del TJUE, que abre el 
sistema jurídico europeo a influencias externas.  
 
Palabras clave: Naturaleza jurídica del proyecto europeo; constitucionalismo global; ética global; 
arbitraje internacional.  
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principles of rule of Law: Global Constitutionalism and World-Ethics? 2. THE CLASSICAL 
ANALYSIS: THE EU THROUGH THE LENS OF THE NATION-STATE. 2.1. The International 
Organization. 2.2. The Federal State. 2.3. The Constitutional project. 3. THE PROPOSAL OF THE 
PROJECT: EU LAW AS AN EXAMPLE OF GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM. 3.1. The European 
Legal Order as an open system. 3.2. One possible example to examine: Achmea and the change of 
direction in CETA. 4. CONCLUSION AND PROPOSAL- 5. BIBLIOGRAPHY 
1. INTRODUCTION. ON THE (ETERNAL) DEBATE ABOUT THE 
NATURE OF THE EU  
Between many defiant debates that have been introduced by EU Law, the 
one about its own nature boasts a prominent position. As it is well known, it has 
been a classical object of debate among European Lawyers, given its crucial legal 
and political implications. Therefore, it is obvious that the aim of this project is not 
to propose a “definitive” solution to the question, which would possibly be futile, 
neither to compile all the existent lines of thinking in this matter1. The objective of 
this project will be to introduce a new line of analysis to the problem, with the hope 
that it might enrich the debate in a certain sense.  
As a starting point, we will expose briefly the methodological and conceptual 
instruments which are essential to build the project up. This seems a necessary step 
in order to articulate our reasoning.  
1.1. “Closed” system and “open” system  
This conceptual couple is very well recognized within the Theory of Law, 
and in particular in its branch known as methodology of Law. In fact, this 
distinction was more than possibly imported from Philosophy (by the way, this 
vocabulary is also common in Physics), but despite its origins alien to the field of 
Law it results essential in a modern systematical construction of legal orders. To 
this effect, we assume a definition of the legal system as an order of connections 
between principles and legal rules, complying with the essential characteristics of 
unity and coherence and -more dubiously- exhaustivity.  
Therefore, a closed system would be that systematic construction in which 
these three characteristics would reach its maximum degree, offering always 
mechanisms to solve any particular cases without any reference to any element 
external to the system itself. These closed systems, however, are mainly theoretical 
                                                 
1 Vid., as a general approach, Von Bogdandy, A. (2016): European Law Beyond ‘Ever Closer Union’ 
Repositioning the Concept, its Thrust and the ECJ's Comparative Methodology, European Law Journal 
22/4, 519-538, a key work that proposes a syncretic or “ecumenical” model to understand not only the 
EU, but the whole European constitutional and legal phenomenon. This is exactly pointing at the line of 
work that we would like to follow in the present project. It is also useful to see Díez-Picazo Giménez, 
L.M. (2008): “La naturaleza de la Unión Europea”, InDret, 4/2008, which contains an extensive analysis 
on the tendencies of understanding the nature of the EU (if this word, “nature”, is adequate at all, is 
something to be examined within the project itself). 
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elaborations (see, for example, the famous example of the jurisprudence of 
concepts) and it is difficult to find examples which are actually existent within the 
real world. On the other hand, some systems that might be called “closed” do not 
comply exactly with these three features, and so some problems of unity, coherence 
and exhaustivity might appear. However, in any case these “real” or semi-closed 
systems tend to solve those problems, always with mechanisms internal to the 
system itself, even if the result might reveal some kind of “imperfection”. In our 
view, this is the case of classical State legal systems. This “imperfection” on how 
these systems are closed is at the same time a crucial element of their current 
tendency to openness: as soon as there is an imperfection within the system a breach 
is opened and this might allow external elements to enter. This semi-closed model is 
still useful, not only for States (for which it is the main applicable theory) but also 
for certain EU-powers still based upon territory.  
On the other hand, we call “open system” to that which admits modifications 
and influences of any kind, including those original of alien systems and of different 
sciences, renouncing to an a priori solution for all the questions. This would be the 
case of the “internal” system, identified with the contemporary constitutional legal 
system, which is founded upon an array of non-rigid legal principles that are said to 
be “fragmentary”2. In our view, this openness might happen in two different 
directions: either “up” (this would mean that the system is part or has relationships 
with “bigger” or “superior” systems, with which it would share information) or 
“down” (which would mean that the system has relationships with “smaller” or 
more particular systems. In the case of the EU legal system, our aim in this project 
will be to show that is must constitute an open system of Law, which would have an 
influence ad infra or down (on the legal systems of the member States) and also an 
influence ad supra or up (on global constitutionalism).  
1.2. Global Constitutionalism  
The second key element of our proposal will be the comprehension of the EU 
system of Law within a broader line of research, Global Constitutionalism. So, the 
idea is not that both EU Law and the doctrine of Global Constitutionalism are 
completely different, but that, in some sense, the legal theory behind the EU-project 
might be at the same time a key element in building up a theory of Global 
Constitutionalism.  
Global Constitutionalism is, of course, a polemic concept, which nature is by 
no means utterly clear3; that said, as a starting point it is necessary to establish a 
                                                 
2 Vid. in general on all this reasoning Larenz, K. y Canaris, C.W. (1995): Methodenlehre der 
Rechtswissenschaft, 3ª ed. Springer, Lehrbuch. Berlin-Heidelberg, pág. 263 (on the concept of system 
and its importance for the Science of Law) y 314-15 (on the different kinds of system).  
3 On the Global Constitutionalism debate, vid. as reference works Ferrajoli, L. (1996): “Beyond 
Sovereignty and Citizenship: a Global Constitutionalism”, Bellamy, R. (Ed.), Constitutionalism, 
Democracy and Sovereignty: American and European Perspectives, Avebury. Aldershot. and Slaughter, 
A.M. and Burke-White, W.W., (2002): “An International Constitutional Moment”, Harvard 
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certain definition or minimum content of this notion4. In our view, it would not be 
reasonable to demand to Global Constitutionalism that it was founded upon a 
constitutional or fundamental positive global legal rule. In a purely political sense, 
the aim of reaching a global political consensus on that rule, writing it down in a 
legal text and applying it, seems such a Utopia that no sensitive legal scholar would 
bet for such a solution. There might be attempts to make global constitutionalism’s 
constructions upon the UN-Charter5, but this can hardly be seen as a proper global 
positive constitutional charter. The crucial problem here is possible the lacking of a 
“Global People” or, even more fanciful, a “Global Nation”6. This lack of a Global 
People implies a lack of a Global Legitimacy, from a democratic point of view.  
In our view, a different perspective would enrich more a theory of Global 
Constitutionalism. The idea would be to found this doctrine upon global principles 
of the rule of Law. This is, as we understand it, the line of thought of a majority of 
scholars involved in Global Law. If this is true, EU Law would fit into Global 
Constitutionalism in a tiple sense. Firstly, as a predecessor, as a necessary previous 
step. Secondly, as a model. And thirdly, as a structuring element of that concept. 
That said, the permanent problem will be, either the identification of such principles 
of the rule of Law which have reached a global status, or, on the other hand, their 
selection. Both methods are clearly different. In the first case, the conception which 
lies underneath is that of a iusnaturalistic or “immanent” set of principles. On the 
second case, this is an artificial operation, in which the principles are selected from 
the array of constitutional principles of Law of the Nation State, and that might be 
not be limited to those which are well know within western countries (both of Civil 
and Common Law traditions) but that can refer as well to constitutional principles 
developed in other philosophical or legal traditions, such as those of the eastern 
world or the so called “Global South”. Which of these two points of view is to 
prevail is a question on to resolved by the project, so the only thing we can do now 
is to point it out.  
                                                                                                                  
International Law Journal, 43(1), 2-21, together with the most comprehensive work, Lang, A.F. y 
Wiener, A. Handbook on Global Constitutionalism, Cheltenham: Elgar.  
4 This would mean, amidst other consequences, that Global Constitutionalism and Global Law cannot be 
reduced to the category of “key concept”, in the sense that these would just be expressions which 
enhance research in an avant-garde topic, but without any conceptual autonomy. In this sense vid. 
Darnaculleta Gardella, M.M. (2016): “El Derecho Administrativo Global. ¿Un nuevo concepto clave del 
Derecho Administrativo?”, Revista de Administración Pública, 199, 11-49, págs. 47-48 and Díez Sastre, 
S. (2018): La formación de conceptos en el Derecho Público. Marcial Pons. Madrid, pág. 134. However, 
this conclusion seems inaccurate and insufficient to characterize the whole of the phenomenon. Some 
substantive definition for Global Law and Global Constitutionalism must be found.  
5 See, for example, Doyle, M.W. (2017): The UN-Charter and Global Constitutionalism?, Lang, A.F. y 
Wiener, A. Handbook on Global Constitutionalism, Cheltenham: Elgar, 338-354.  
6 However, a progressive line of thought of Global Constitutionalism, which seeks to found this doctrine 
upon the establishment of procedural and economical guarantees for world-citizens, criticizes this point 
of view. The reasons given are its apparently restrictive nature, and its theoretical roots, which link the 
need for a “Global People” to fund a proper Global Constitutionalism with the schmittian constitutional 
analysis and even a nationalistic or ethnic restriction for the Constitution. This is the position which can 
be found on Ferrajoli, L. (2018): Constitucionalismo más allá del Estado, Madrid: Trotta, 54-56.  
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In any case, what we want to establish now is that, in our conception, Global 
Constitutionalism must be build up as a constitutional system of Law, based on 
principles, open ab and ad infra (this means, it receives influences from “smaller” 
systems of Law and, at the same time, it influences them), and that would 
comprehend all these “smaller” systems of Law (such as EU-Law and other regional 
systems of proto-constitutionalism, together with national constitutional, State-
based systems). This system is still in a starting point of construction, to which this 
projects aims to contribute. However, it is not still a positive system of Law which 
existence can be verified in the real world in a simple way, but a legal elaboration 
from an array of factual legal advances (the normative power of international 
organizations and globally powerful private subjects, the decisions of International 
Courts of Law, International Arbitration, the quasi-constitutional effect of certain 
International Treaties such as the UN-Charter or the Rome Convention of Human 
Rights, and the universalization of principles of the rule of Law, between many 
others).  
1.3. The reach of common principles of rule of Law: Global Constitutionalism 
and World-Ethics? 
In order to back the construction of a Global Constitutional set of principles, 
as we have explained, we will need to clarify, firstly, if those principles are global 
and, even more, universal “by nature”, o if they are just artificial or cultural 
principles, selected to have an effect on the global space, where they are 
undoubtedly useful. And secondly, which will be the method we shall employ to 
discover or select those global principles of Law.  
As we have already established, these questions must be solved in the 
development of the project, not now. However, we want to expose now another 
starting point which will make easier for us to get to this answer. If a global set of 
constitutional principles is to be established, it follows that a minimum ethical 
consensus will be necessary. Certainly, and regardless of the iusnaturalistic or 
contingent nature of those principles, it seems clear to us that all of them must be 
backed by a certain theory of morals, and therefore al of them will answer to a 
certain ethical conception7. This is of course also true for the so called 
“constitutional values”, an expression we prefer to avoid (in this project we will 
better speak about principles).  
However, is it actually a possibility to find several principles of Law that 
might be shared globally? To answer this question, a recourse to the theory of ethics 
will be more than useful. In effect, theory of ethics has already dealt with this 
                                                 
7 For Bobbio, this is actually the essential assumption of iusnaturalism: not a particular morality, but a 
theory oof morals, which argues that there is an essential relationships between rules of Law and 
morality, vid. Bobbio, N. (2015): Iusnaturalismo y positivismo jurídico. Madrid. Trotta, 132. We can 
even argue that iusnaturalism is even a metha-theory of morals, in the sense that it is not either a 
particular theory, but a set of theories which have in common the necessary connection between morals 
(and, usually, political theology, in the donosian-schmittian sense) and Law.  
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question for a long time. And, within this doctrine, there have been several 
examples of intents to reach a theory of World-ethics. In the modern times, one 
notable example is that of H. Küng, who has argued for a World-range ethics for 
postmodernity, understanding it as the “sublation” of modernity in the hegelian 
sense. This would imply a separation from extreme pluralistic and relativistic 
models and an assumption of postmodernity not as incompatible with a democratic 
pluralism, but on the contrary, a necessary step for its conservation, through a global 
consensus on morals. So, modernity would transcend into a “pluralistic-holistic 
synthesis” which would be part of a “postmodern constellation” and that would 
materialize into a World Ethic8.  
Of course, this theory might be subject to its own critics. It is opposed to 
other widely influential points of view, including the comunitarism theory9 and the 
Luhmann’s theory of systems. Another contentious point is the central role that the 
author gives to the dialogue between religions, which for some might no be the 
crucial element of a global theory of ethics. However, in this point we are very near 
Küng: certainly, religion is still today the main support for moral systems, and a 
global ethics -and the same is true for a Global Constitutionalism- should start its 
construction from an inter-religious dialogue, an strategy that seems more effective 
than imposing western “values” globally. In any case, the crucial point here is that, 
with a theory of World or global ethics, we have a reference point to start discussing 
about a system of global constitutional principles. The method of abstraction of 
moral and legal principles is mimetic, and the aim of Global Constitutionalism as a 
political project is similar to global ethics: a consensus on the principles10.  
                                                 
8 Vid. Küng, H. (1999): Projekt Weltethos, Piper. Munich, 43-45.  
9 However, there are some comunitaristic theories which are curiously convergent with that of Küng. It it 
the case of Walzer, M. (1994): Thick and Thin. Moral Argument at Home and Abroad. Notre Dame. 
Notre Dame Press. In this work the author proposes a theory of ethics, which makes a proposal of a 
division between a “thick” and a “thin” morals, the first being a particular moral system developed in a 
wide extension and that might be found in a society in particular, and the second -thin- one would be the 
result of an agreement between members of different societies in certain matters, and that would be the 
only morals exigible to a foreigner. This thin minimum in morals would constitute a core morality, 
however always a socially elaborated one, never a “natural minimum”. Nevertheless, regardless this 
theoretical “caveat” which preserves the author’s coherence within comunitarism, this proposal 
resembles to that of Küng, and in fact it is to say that both have references to common legal texts, such as 
those of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Certainly, a common argument about the 1948 
Declaration is that it is flexible enough in its content to be adopted universally, vid. Riedel, E.H. (2003): 
Universality of Human Rights and Cultural Pluralism, König, C. and Lorz, R.A., Die Universalität der 
Menschenrechte. Philosophische Grundlagen, Nationale Gewährleistungen, Internationale Garantien, 
Berlin, Duncker & Humboldt, 139-162, especially 162. 
10 This seems a common assumption for Global Constitutionalism. Vid. Garrido Gómez, M.I., (2018): 
“The decadence of Legislative Discourse”, Rechtstheorie, 49(2), 155-174, pág. 169.  
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2. THE CLASSICAL ANALYSIS: THE EU THROUGH THE LENS OF THE 
NATION-STATE  
We have established the methodological grounds of the project’s proposal. 
However, the question about the nature of the EU has traditionally been approached 
from the point of view of International Law and State-constitutionalism. The 
context of this is, of course, the loss of power of the Nation-State, which of course 
has already been discussed for a very long time11. We shall now summarize very 
briefly these classical positions, in order to make contrast against our own proposal.  
The three main ways of analysis on the question about the nature of the EU 
might be classified as follows: the International Organization, the Federal State and 
the Constitutional State. Very briefly, the basic elements of these three theories are 
the following:  
2.1. The International Organization  
The first line of research, the earlier one, puts the EU into the context of 
International Law. This seems obvious in the first place, being the EU structured on 
a series of International Treaties. It is certainly true that the EU is an International 
Organization, but this seems not enough to understand its whole nature. The point 
about this theory is precisely to reject any Federal or Constitutional construction: for 
supporters of the International Law perspective, the EU must not be recognized to 
go any further than the inter-State level, and so the entire sovereignty of the Nation-
State is preserved within the Member States12.  
As some kind of “transition” proposal, it is increasingly common to refer to 
the EU as a “Supranational Organization”. The exact meaning of this expression is 
actually unclear. It is assumed that this concept could preserve the International 
nature of the EU, at least in part, without reaching to affirm its State-nature, but 
recognizing some kind of advance from the model of International Organization. 
This would mean that certain State-powers remain within the Member-States, but 
are exercised by an independent organization. It could be, in some sense, an open 
way to an important evolution of the EU, both in the political and legal sense13. This 
has been put in connection with the normative autonomy boasted by some 
International Organizations, such as the WTO, FAO or OECD, and some 
                                                 
11 Vid. for a classical example Galán Gutiérrez, E. (1959): “El porvenir del Estado en Europa”, en 
AA.VV, Homenaje a Nicolás Pérez Serrano. Madrid. Reus. 352-399. 
12 For example, Vid. a clear expression between Spanish scholars in Mangas Martín, A. y Liñán 
Nogueras, D.J. (2016): Instituciones y Derecho de la Unión Europea. Madrid. Tecnos., pág. 47.  
13 In this sense, Sarmiento Ramírez-Escudero, D. (2018): El Derecho de la Unión Europea. Madrid. 
Marcial Pons., págs. 44-45.  
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recommendations in specific and technical economic sectors14, all of which are 
actually important examples of Global Law themselves. This second line of thought 
is nearer to a contemporary comprehension of the EU phenomenon, but it is far 
from being the last word on the problem.  
2.2. The Federal State  
Possibly the proposal which rises the strongest debate -apart from the 
European Constitution, a connected question with which we will deal immediately- 
it tries, in very general terms, to take the Federal model from some Member States 
to the EU-level, being sometimes influenced by the USA model as well15. It works 
as some kind of antithesis of the International perspective, and therefore is always in 
conflict with it. Between both “extreme” proposals, our theoretical construction of 
an EU legal system within the dynamics of Global Constitutionalism seems as a 
“medium term”. The project for a European Constitution itself has been conceived 
as a effort to build up a feasible Federal State within the EU, however admitting at 
the same time a strong critical approach coming from many Member States, even 
Federalist ones, because of the difficulties of adapting such a legal tradition to a 
supranational entity16. For the Federalist model, a very common legal method to 
apply is that of Comparative Law, precisely because of a constant try to adapt 
already existing federal models to the European context. For example, an economic 
analysis has been applied to compare both Canadian and EU common market 
systems. The result seems surprising, but possibly it is not so much the case: the EU 
Common Market is certainly more integrated and evolved17. Even the rejection of 
the European Constitution has been identified with an “evolutionary 
constitutionalism”, a necessary step common to the creation of other federal States 
such as Canada or Switzerland18.  
                                                 
14 For example, the fishing industry, just to give one example given by the author, vid. Czuczai, J. (2012): 
“The autonomy of the EU legal order and the law-making activities of international organizations. Some 
examples regarding the Council most recent practice”, European Legal Studies, Research Paper 3/2012.  
15 For a relatively early proposal vid. Everling, U. (1989): “Zur föderalen Struktur der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft”, en Hailbronner, K., Ress, G. y Stein, T. (eds.), Staat un Völkerrechtsordnung, 
Heidelberg: Springer, págs. 179-198, págs. 181 y ss.  
16 Zalany, N. P. (2003): “The European Union Constitution and its Effects on Federalism in the EU”, 
Ohio State Law Journal, v. 66, 615-651, 624 (for an appraisal of the European Constitution of 2004) y 
615 (para las críticas, citando una publicación periodística: Economist, (2003): “Tidying Up or 
Tyranny?”, Economist, May 31, 2003, 51, disponible en: 
https://www.economist.com/europe/2003/05/29/tidying-up-or-tyranny.  
17 Vid. Hinarejos García, A. (2012): Free movement, federalism and institutional choice: a Canada-EU 
comparison, Cambridge Law Journal, 71(3), pp. 537-566, pág. 538.  
18 Martinico, G. (2011): “Constitutional Failure or Constitutional Odyssey? What Can We Learn From 
Comparative Law?”, Perspectives on Federalism, 3 (1), pág. 53.  
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2.3. The Constitutional project  
As it is well known, the EU Constitutional project of 2003, abandoned 
politically in 2005 after its democratic rejection in France and the Netherlands, has 
been the highest political bet within the EU-nature debate. It has been the case in 
which the EU has tried to go the furthest away from the International perspective, 
approaching Union towards the Nation-State. It had been said since the adoption of 
the Treaty of Niza that it was a matter of need for the EU to evolve from the Treaty 
system to a constitutional regimen, even in the normative sense19. However, an 
opposed line of thought doubted that the essential conditions for a Federal 
Constitutional State were given within the EU, lacking both a constituent demos and 
any previous kind of constitutional adoption process20. It was also argued that a 
future Constitutional Treaty should have (normative) appearance and functions of a 
Constitution, including a mechanism to resolve normative conflicts between EU 
Law and the legal systems of the Member States, establishing the principle of 
Primacy21. Finally, as it is well known, the political failure of the EU Constitution 
boosts a reaction that seeks to conserve a many advances as it was possible into the 
Treaty of Lisbon, however sacrificing the “name” itself22. The constitutional 
proposal is not itself our matter of discussion, but a precedent that justifies the 
subject matter of the proposed project: searching an alternative way to explain the 
nature of the EU, which might be better founded in the dogmatic sense, but that is -
in principle- less polemical politically. Our aim is to look for this answer in a legal 
system construction of EU Law within the concept of Global Constitutionalism.  
3. THE PROPOSAL OF THE PROJECT: EU LAW AS AN EXAMPLE OF 
GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM  
3.1. The European Legal Order as an open system  
This latter claim does not mean that the project is naive about the political 
effects of this proposal. In fact, as long as any legal construction has a certain 
political background, it would be impossible to purely distinguish a “legal” from a 
“political” face of the Law. That said, our idea is to avoid the highly contentious 
                                                 
19 De Witte, B. (2001): “The Nice Declaration: Time for a Constitutional Treaty of the European 
Union?”, The International Spectator, no. 1.  
20 Weiler, J.H.H. (2003): Europe’s Constitutional Sonderweg, Weiler, J.H.H. and Wind, W. (eds.), 
European Constitutionalism beyond the State, Cambridge. CUP, 7-23, 9.  
21 Cruz Villalón, P. (2004): “Nationale Verfassungsangleichung zur Stunde europäischer 
Verfassungsgebung”, en Blankenagel, A., Pernice, I. y Schulze-Fielitz, H., Verfassung im Diskurs der 
Welt. Liber amicorum für Peter Häberle, 207-221, pág. 220. 
22 Reh, C. (2009): “The Lisbon Treaty: De-Constitutionalizing the European Union?”, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, Volume 47. Number 3. pp. 625-650.  
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political questions which lie behind the International-Constitutional/Federal debate 
about the EU, and instead to focus on the legal dogmatic side of the problem.  
To sum up, the project aims at building up at legal construction of a system 
of EU Law within an evolving system of Global Constitutionalism. EU Law would 
be a legal order within the global space, and it would have an autonomous nature, 
but without being actually “closed”. On the contrary, it would be an “intermediate” 
system of Law. This means that it is an open system both “up” and “down”. 
“Down”, the EU legal order takes part into the internal legal orders of the Member 
States through their reception of the Treaties and the rest of European Legal rules. 
At the same time, EU Law is influenced by the Member States’ Legal systems 
through various ways, and particularly via the national Judge, who as it is known 
acts as well as European Judge. Of singular importance for the project will be the 
question about European citizenship, in which -as a general rule- is the 
constitutional system of Member States the one which determines who is to be an 
European citizen, through their own nationality23, establishing a dialogue between 
constitutional systems which is of the utmost importance for our proposal. An 
example for the dialogue between EU and Member State’s legal systems in which 
the European level influences the national legal order would be the conforming 
interpretation of Member State’s Law to EU Law24. Both directions of influence are 
necessary, and however not enough to fully understand the position of the EU 
constitutional system in the global space.  
At the same time, “Up” the European Legal order is part of the continuous 
construction of a broader legal system, Global Constitutionalism. Or, expressed in 
other words, through the system-building of the EU, we will try to make a 
contribution to the system-building of Global Constitutionalism, as the first is 
conceived to be a necessary step for the second. This global constitutional system 
must therefore be integrated by principles of Law already recognized in European 
Law25, such as the rule of law26, of course in convergence with “other” concepts of 
rule of Law, such as the one elaborated in English Common Law or in the USA. To 
give another example of an European legal principle that might be found in Global 
Constitutionalism, we could mention proportionality. It has been said, with strong 
dogmatic grounds, that both in a substantive sense and as flexible formalism for a 
                                                 
23 Vid. in this sense Von Bogdandy, A. and Arndt, F. (2011): European Citizenship, Wolfrum, R. 
(General Editor), Sólveigardóttir, M. (Managing Editor) et al., Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law, OUP, available in 
https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-
e615?rskey=i44x9w&result=1&prd=EPIL (especially vid. point A.2.(a)2.). 
24 Vid. Rodríguez de Santiago, J.M. (2016): Metodología del Derecho Administrativo. Reglas de 
racionalidad para la adopción y el control de la decisión administrativa, Madrid. Marcial Pons, 82-88.  
25 As a referential work for this, vid. Von Bogdandy, A. (2010): Founding Principles. Von Bogdandy, A. 
y Bast, J. (eds.), Principles of European Constitutional Law, Oxford, München, Hart Publishing, Verlag 
C.H. Beck, 11-54. 
26 Pech, L. (2009): “The Rule of Law as a Constitutional Principle of the European Union”, Jean Monnet 
Working Paper Series No. 4/2009.  
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pluralistic society, proportionality plays a role in the OMC system, which might be 
extended to other areas of Global Law27. 
3.2. One possible example to examine: Achmea and the change of direction in 
CETA.  
Ton conclude the project proposal, we will try to show how, through the 
contraposition of two very recent (and controversial) cases, the “opening” of the EU 
legal system is actually a conclusion which can be reached from the evolution of EU 
Law itself. The two cases in question are Achmea28 and CETA29. In the first case, the 
ECJ decided that an arbitration clause incorporated to a Bilateral Investment Treaty 
(BIT) signed between two Member States, as well as the following execution of the 
arbitral award within one of these States, were in violation of EU Law. In particular, 
the recourse to an international arbitration was in breach of both the principle of 
mutual trust between Member States (even if the Treaty was signed prior to the 
access of one of the Member States involved to the EU) and the principle of 
uniformity and autonomy of the EU legal order (58). It was a key issue in CJEU’s 
judgment that the arbitral tribunal is not a judicial organ in terms of asking it for a 
preliminary ruling30.  
The second case answers an Opinion asked to the CJEU on the compatibility 
of another arbitral clause contained within an International Treaty, but this time is 
not a Treaty signed between two different Member States, but between the EU itself 
and a third State, Canada. It is, of course, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA), which intends to establish a free-trade and non-tariff area 
between both markets within certain conditions. As it is usual in this kind of 
Treaties, it includes an arbitration clause (in fact, a whole dispute resolution 
mechanism). Within the period of 13 months between both decisions, the possibility 
that the Achmea criterium was applied to the CETA case was always at stake. 
However, the CJEU distinguished both cases and departed from the doctrine of the 
immediate precedent, assuming it was actually no applicable to an EU Treaty with a 
non-Member State. Therefore, a less restrictive criterium was applied. It is true that, 
as a consequence of the application of such a mechanism, an arbitral tribunal might 
apply EU Law in the future. This, in principle, would be contrary to EU Law -
following Achmea- if this institution is not allowed to ask the CJEU for a 
preliminary ruling. However, in this case, following the Opinion of the Advocate 
General31, the CJEU finds that this mechanism is not, in principle, in breach of EU 
                                                 
27 Vid. Peters, A. (2017): Proportionality as a global constitutional principle, en Lang, A.F. y Wiener, A. 
Handbook on Global Constitutionalism, Cheltenham: Elgar, 248-264, 257. 
28 Case C-284/16, 6 March 2018 (Slovak Republik v. Achmea BV).  
29 Opinion 1/17 CJEU 30 April 2019 (UE-Canada CETA Agreement).  
30 For an analysis of this case in depth, vid. Iglesias Sevillano, H. (2018): “El arbitraje internacional como 
camino hacia una justicia jurídico-pública global”, Revista de Administración Pública, n. 206, 291-318, 
págs. 303-307.  
31 Opinion 1/2019, January the 29th, by Advocate General Bot.  
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Law, among other reasons, because it does not violate the principle of effectiveness 
of EU Law in competition matters32.  
In conclusion, and to focus on the point that is of interest for the purposes of 
this project, the CJEU assumes that an international arbitration mechanism is an 
acceptable method to resolve disputes under an international treaty, and might be 
also applicable to the EU, even if a consequence of this is that an arbitrator or 
arbitral tribunal finds itself applying EU Law. In the dogmatic sense, this has a 
crucial aftermath. With the reasons presented by the CJEU in Achmea, which 
interpreted the principles of coherence and autonomy of EU’s legal order very 
strictly, the European legal system was built up as a closed system, and this meant 
that no supranational influence, either outwards or inwards, was allowed. Of course, 
Achmea was itself a too particular judgment to allow us to claim this plainly, but it 
seemed clear that this was the dogmatic idea which supported the decision. Thus, 
and perhaps surprisingly, the EU legal order, which is itself a supranational order 
and which owes its existence precisely to a weakening of the Nation-State in Europe 
and its closed constitutional-legal orders, tried to build itself up as a closed legal 
order, rejecting the influence of different institutions and powers existing in the 
global arena. With the CETA decision, this seems to change deeply, even if the 
judgement establishes certain limits to the arbitration clause. But in any case this 
second decision does not only admit that the arbitration clause within this particular 
Treaty is not in breach EU Law, but also that the European legal order is open to 
influence and receive influence from supranational or global institutions. This latter 
change is key to our proposal, for this is a necessary presupposition to affirm that 
EU’s constitutional principles can actually both be influenced by the Member States 
constitutional orders and at the same time influence a growing Global 
Constitutionalism. And so, the EU can continue with its role of contributing -
decisively- to the construction of a Global rule of Law.  
4. CONCLUSION AND PROPOSAL 
We shall conclude this project presentation with a very brief summary. We 
have assumed that the EU constitutes an open legal order, and that there is a 
supranacional set of constitutional principles in construction, which is most 
commonly known as Global Constitutionalism. The aim of this project is to 
demonstrate that both events are true, in the first place, and that both are connected 
between themselves, in the second place. So, the project will focus on how the EU 
legal order influences and is influenced by a Global Constitutionalism, in the 
construction of which the EU constitutional principles of Law inherited from its 
Member States, and essentially the rule of Law, must have a prevailing influence. 
To show this, we will try to find examples of mutual influence between EU Law 
                                                 
32 In paragraph 188. Competition was a matter on which the consultation had already focused. The 
Opinion issued by the CJEU is complex and should be examined in depth by the project. By now, it 
should be enough to present this brief summary of the discussion.  
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and global institutions and rules, such as the example offered before with the 
Achmea and CETA cases of the CJEU.  
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